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PROFESSIONALS, POLITICOS, AND CRONY 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL:  A HISTORICAL 
SKETCH OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL 
AS A CASE FOR STRUCTURAL INDEPENDENCE 
Jed Handelsman Shugerman* 
INTRODUCTION 
When you get to the White House there are two jobs you must lock up—
Attorney General and director of the Internal Revenue Service. 
—Joe Kennedy, Sr. to John F. Kennedy, perhaps apocryphally1 
Historically, the office of the U.S. Attorney General has been identified as 
“quasi-judicial” or having “quasi-judicial” aspects.2  Other parts of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) have also been described as quasi-judicial, such 
as the Office of Legal Counsel and the Solicitor General.3  A glance at a list 
of past attorneys general seems to confirm this judicial aspiration in practice.  
Nine attorneys general became U.S. Supreme Court justices,4 and others 
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Stahl, and Steve Vladeck.  John M. Shaw and Gail McDonald provided outstanding research 
assistance, and Michael Nester and Lauren Gorab provided excellent editing.  I also thank 
Danya Handelsman for her thoughtfulness and support.  This Article was prepared for the 
Colloquium entitled The Varied Roles, Regulation, and Professional Responsibilities of 
Government Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and 
Ethics on October 12, 2018, at Fordham University School of Law.  For an overview of the 
Colloquium, see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers in Government Service—a Foreword, 87 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1791 (2019). 
 
 1. LARRY TYE, BOBBY KENNEDY 458 n.133 (2016) (citing MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, THE 
CRISIS YEARS:  KENNEDY AND KHRUSHCHEV, 1960–1963, at 302 (1991)); John P. Roche, The 
Second Coming of R.F.K., NAT’L REV., July 22, 1988, at 32, 34. 
 2. See CALEB CUSHING, A REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, SUGGESTING 
MODIFICATIONS IN THE MANNER OF CONDUCTING THE LEGAL BUSINESS OF THE GOVERNMENT:  
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 33-55, at 6 (1854) 
[hereinafter CUSHING REPORT]; see also Caleb Cushing, Office and Duties of the Attorney 
General, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 334 (1854) [hereinafter Cushing Opinion].  Cushing also noted 
that Congress established the Office of the Attorney General “in organizing the judicial 
business of the United States.” Cushing Opinion, supra, at 330. 
 3. See Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 815 (2017). 
 4. The attorneys general who became Supreme Court justices were:  Roger Taney, 
Nathan Clifford, Joseph McKenna, William Moody, James McReynolds, Harlan Fiske Stone, 
Frank Murphy, Robert Jackson, and Tom Clark. See Attorneys General of the United States, 
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were notably judicious and professional in their tenure in the office.5  Of 
course, there are some infamous examples of unprofessional cronyism—the 
appointment of friends or associates to positions of authority, without 
properly considering their qualifications—but there are famous 
counterexamples of those who stood up to the presidents they served in 
defense of legal principles.  The “insider” friend, fixer, or brother of the 
president was presumably the exception. 
But a closer examination of the history of the Office of the Attorney 
General reveals a surprising pattern:  the nineteenth century had relatively 
few crony-ist appointments in an era known for patronage, but the twentieth 
century ushered in more partisan insiders, hacks, and fixers,6 just as the 
DOJ’s power grew enormously.7  This shift was remarkably bipartisan, 
starting under President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, and then continuing 
immediately after under President Warren G. Harding, a Republican.8  
Perhaps this turn in the late 1910s started an era of partisan escalation as each 
political party pushed the norms as they rotated into power.  This Article 
suggests that these trends have contributed to making the DOJ partisan and 
allowing some presidents to imagine the Attorney General as the president’s 
personal lawyer and fixer.  In just over half of the past century, the Office of 
the Attorney General has been filled by a partisan insider. 
This research revealed a number of especially surprising patterns.  First, 
nineteenth-century America is known for the rise of the patronage party 
system.  Formal professionalization—especially legal professionalization—
emerged somewhat late in the nineteenth century.9  Nevertheless, there were 
relatively few crony or patronage attorneys general in an era of patronage 
without professionalization or recently emerging professionalization.  
Second, the Progressive Era (roughly 1900 to 1920) is thought of as an era 
of reforming the partisan machine, of anti-patronage, and of anti-corruption.  
Yet, the rise of the crony or partisan campaign-insider Attorney General 
began in the Progressive Era under President Woodrow Wilson and escalated 
from there, including in the Roosevelt administration, which was also 
perceived as a shift to administrative expertise (e.g., the “Brain Trust”) or at 
least a team of established politicos.10  The third surprise is just how 
 
DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/historical-bios?sort_by=field_dates_service_value2 
&sort_order=ASC [https://perma.cc/5RDK-HU83] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (providing 
biographies for each attorney general, including those who became Supreme Court justices). 
 5. These include Edmund Randolph, William Wirt, Caleb Cushing, William M. Evarts, 
Ebenezer R. Hoar, Homer Cummings, William Rogers, and Elliot Richardson. Id. 
 6. For a shorter version, see Jed Shugerman, Think Matthew Whitaker Is a Hack?  He’s 
One of Many, WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/think-
matthew-whitaker-is-a-hack-hes-one-of-many/2018/11/16/5efbf47c-e8f7-11e8-b8dc-66cca 
409c180_story.html [https://perma.cc/B9A5-M88N]. 
 7. See generally Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of 
Justice:  Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 170 
(2014). 
 8. Id. at 170 n.277. 
 9. See id. at 121. 
 10. See id. at 170 n.277. 
2019] CRONY ATTORNEYS GENERAL 1967 
bipartisan the cronyism of the Attorney General has been in the twentieth 
century.  Democrats accounted for more of the partisan insiderism of the mid-
twentieth century, though the party balance has shifted toward the 
Republicans decisively since the Nixon-Reagan era.11  The nepotism of the 
Kennedy administration with brother-protector Bobby Kennedy and the 
corruption of the Nixon administration are most famous to modern observers, 
but the origins go further back to a time perceived to be more progressive 
and professional. 
In Part I, this Article presents an overview of that pattern among attorneys 
general, using the rough categories of “professional,” “politico,” and 
“insider” or “crony,” based on their background and how they became 
Attorney General rather than based upon their performance in the office.  
This Part highlights some major turning points toward cronyism during the 
Progressive Era:  President Wilson’s Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer 
and President Harding’s Attorney General Harry Daugherty.  This focus will 
highlight how that rise of cronyism contributed to the abuses and corruption 
under those two attorneys general.  Part II offers a preview of a historical 
critique of the unitary-executive theory on prosecution, exemplified in 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson,12 a position that would prevent 
many structural reforms.13  That position seems to be incorrect in its 
historical assumptions.14  Part III offers some preliminary suggestions for 
structural reform of the Office of the Attorney General and other parts of the 
DOJ, borrowing from the independent agency model, while remaining 
consistent with Article II’s Take Care and Vesting Clauses.15  The 
breakdown of the norms of prosecutorial independence from partisanship is 
not a new phenomenon; it is a century in the making.  The solutions borrow 
from some models that have grown elsewhere in the executive branch over 
that same century. 
I.  PROFESSIONALS, POLITICOS, AND PATRONAGE INSIDERS 
I went through the list of every Attorney General who served at least one 
year, plus a few more with shorter but significant tenures, and excluded 
 
 11. To illustrate this point, see infra Table 1 (listing every attorney general who served at 
least one year, with some exceptions, and categorizing each attorney general’s rise to the 
office). 
 12. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 13. Id. at 696–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  This Colloquium Article is a preview of 
historical arguments on the executive, prosecution, and Morrison v. Olson that will be 
developed more fully in a future article. 
 14. See Jed Shugerman, Stare Scalia, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/04/republican-senators-obsession-with-antonin-scalia-is-leading-them-to-
make-sloppy-mistakes.html [https://perma.cc/MW43-U4CF].  This Article draws from that 
short article and sketches the historical argument, which will be laid out in more detail in a 
future article. 
 15. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. art. II, § 3.  For new historical research on the 
Take Care Clause as limiting presidential discretion by the original meaning of “faithful 
execution,” see Andrew Kent, Ethan Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution 
and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2019). 
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acting attorneys general, except for Matthew Whitaker, whose appointment 
came at a particularly significant moment and was especially salient for this 
study.  I checked their backgrounds to get a basic understanding of how these 
individuals rose to the office.  Three categories emerged.  First was the 
politico, a major elected official with established political clout, often as a 
sitting member of Congress.  Sometimes the dynamic is “Team of Rivals,”16 
and sometimes it is party team player.  But the salient feature is that this 
Attorney General had his or her independent electoral base of power and an 
already-established name.  Second was the professional, a lawyer who had 
established himself or herself in private practice, government service, or in 
the judiciary.  Sometimes they are veterans from the DOJ or get promoted 
from within the DOJ.  If they had held elected office, it was brief or less 
prominent.  They brought a reputation for skill to the office more than a 
reputation for power.  The third category was the insider, a friend or direct 
supporter of the president who rises to power substantially because of his 
connection to the president or the president’s political faction.  I sometimes 
use the word “crony” to describe these attorneys general, but that label is 
sometimes too pejorative.  Once in office, some of these insider attorneys 
general would turn out to be more professional and independent, while others 
are simply fixers who get embroiled in scandal. 
The first two models, the politico and the professional, dominate from the 
late eighteenth through the nineteenth century.  The insider model pops up 
under Presidents Andrew Jackson and Ulysses Grant during Reconstruction, 
which should not shock students of either Jackson or Grant.17  But the 1870s 
are surprising given that the Republicans created the DOJ in 1870 to promote 
professionalization and limit patronage.18  The rest of the century returned to 
the professional-politico balance.  Then the early twentieth century shifts 
back to insiders gradually and then overtakes the other models in the mid-
twentieth century.  After a post-Watergate return to the professional model, 
the last few decades have been a mix of all three. 
Table 1, below, provides a quick overview, using “X” to signify the most 
salient category (or, in some cases, two categories that are equally salient) 
for each Attorney General and “*” to signify a secondary category where 
appropriate.  With regard to political party designation, “F” indicates 
Federalist, “D-R” indicates Democratic-Republican, “D” indicates 
Democrat, “W” indicates Whig, and “R” indicates Republican.  Table 1 omits 
all but one acting attorney general and attorneys general with short, 
 
 16. See DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS xvi (2005) (“It soon became clear, 
however, that Abraham Lincoln would emerge the undisputed captain of this most unusual 
cabinet, truly a team of rivals.  The powerful competitors who had originally disdained Lincoln 
became colleagues who helped him steer the country through its darkest days.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 17. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 124, 144 n.138. 
 18. See id. at 121 (“The founding of the DOJ had less to do with Reconstruction, and more 
to do with ‘retrenchment’ (budget cutting and anti-patronage reform).  The DOJ’s creation 
was linked with major professionalization efforts . . . to make the practice of law more 
exclusive and more independent from partisan politics.”). 
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insignificant tenures, and it is followed by a short description of each of the 
insiders or cronies.  
Table 1:  U.S. Attorneys General 1789–2019 
Attorney General Tenure Party Professional Politico Insider/ Crony 
Edmund Randolph 1789–94 F  X  
William Bradford 1794–95 F X   
Charles Lee 1795–1801 F X   
Levi Lincoln 1801–05 D-R X   
John Breckinridge 1805–06 D-R  X  
Caesar Rodney 1807–11 D-R  X  
William Pinkney 1811–14 D-R  X  
Richard Rush 1814–17 F X X  
William Wirt 1817–29 D-R X   
John M. Berrien  1829–31 D X   
Roger B. Taney  1831–33 D  * X 
Benjamin Franklin 
Butler  1833–38 D   X 
Felix Grundy  1838–40 D  X  
Henry D. Gilpin  1840–41 D X   
Hugh S. Legaré  1841–43 D X   
John Nelson  1843–45 W X   
John Y. Mason  1845–46 D  X  
Nathan Clifford  1846–48 D X   
Reverdy Johnson  1849–50 W X X  
John J. 
Crittenden19 1850–53 W  X  
Caleb Cushing 1853–57 D X   
Jeremiah S. Black 1857–60 D X   
Edward Bates  1861–64 R  X  
James Speed  1864–66 R   X 
Henry Stanbery  1866–68 R X   
William M. Evarts 1868–69 R X   
 
 19. Crittenden was close to Zachary Taylor, but he was the quintessential politico, having 
served two terms in the U.S. Senate, an additional two years of another Senate term, a term as 
Governor of Kentucky, and a short earlier stint as the U.S. Attorney General in 1841.  He did 
not get his position as a crony insider. Paul Finkelman, Crittenden, John J. (1787–1863), 
ENCYCLOPEDIA AM. CONST., http://www.encyclopedia.com/politics/encyclopedias-almanacs-
transcripts-and-maps/crittenden-john-j-1787-1863 [https://perma.cc/7M2N-3HFD] (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2019); Crittenden, John Jordan, (1787–1863), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY 
U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=C000912 
[https://perma.cc/379Q-NC3F] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
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Attorney General Tenure Party Professional Politico Insider/ Crony 
Ebenezer R. Hoar 1869–70 R X   
Amos T. Akerman  1870–71 R X   
George Henry 
Williams 1871–75 R  X X 
Edwards 
Pierrepont 1875–76 R X  X 
Alphonso Taft  1876–77 R X X  
Charles Devens  1877–81 R X   
Benjamin H. 
Brewster  1881–85 R X   
Augustus Garland  1885–89 D  X  
William H. H. 
Miller 1889–93 R   X 
Richard Olney 1893–95 D X   
Judson Harmon  1895–97 D X   
Joseph McKenna  1897–98 R X   
John W. Griggs  1898–1901 R  X  
Philander C. Knox  1901–04 R X   
William Henry 
Moody  1904–06 R  X  
Charles Bonaparte  1906–09 R  X  
George W. 
Wickersham  1909–13 R X   
James C. 
McReynolds  1913–14 D X   
Thomas Watt 
Gregory  1914–19 D X   
A. Mitchell 
Palmer 1919–21 D   X 
Harry M. 
Daugherty 1921–24 R   X 
Harlan F. Stone 1924–25 R X   
John G. Sargent 1925–29 R   X 
William D. 
Mitchell 1929–33 R X   
Homer Stille 
Cummings 1933–39 D X  X 
Frank Murphy 1939–40 D  X  
Robert H. Jackson 1940–41 D X  X 
Francis Biddle 1941–45 D X   
Tom C. Clark 1945–49 D X  X 
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Attorney General Tenure Party Professional Politico Insider/ Crony 
J. Howard 
McGrath 1949–52 D   X 
James P. 
McGranery 1952–53 D X   
Herbert 
Brownell Jr. 1953–57 R   X 
William P. Rogers 1957–61 R X   
Robert F. Kennedy 1961–64 D   X 
Nicholas 
Katzenbach 1964–66 D X   
Ramsey Clark 1966–69 D X   
John N. Mitchell 1969–72 R   X 
Richard 
Kleindienst 1972–73 R   X 
Elliot Richardson 1973 R * X  
William B. Saxbe 1974–75 R  X  
Edward H. Levi 1975–77 R X   
Griffin Bell 1977–79 D X   
Benjamin Civiletti 1979–81 D X   
William French 
Smith 1981–85 R X  X 
Edwin Meese 1985–88 R   X 
Dick Thornburgh 1988–91 R  X  
William Barr 1991–93 R X   
Janet Reno 1993–2001 D X   
John Ashcroft 2001–05 R  X  
Alberto Gonzales 2005–07 R   X 
Michael Mukasey 2007–09 R X   
Eric Holder 2009–15 D X   
Loretta Lynch 2015–17 D X   
Jeff Sessions 2017–18 R  X X 
Matthew Whitaker 
(Acting) 2018–19 R   X 
William Barr 2019–Present R  X  
 
For just over half of the past century, the Attorney General of the United 
States has fit more in the partisan-insider mold than the professional or the 
politico molds.  As this trend increased throughout the twentieth century, 
both sides eroded norms of political independence.  Presidents Wilson and 
Harding touched off a new round of cronyism from opposing parties; the 
1972 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
cronyism then continued, alternating parties with Presidents Hoover, 
Franklin Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, W. 
Bush, and then Trump. 
Let us touch on each of these political operators to get a glimpse of their 
path to the office.  Was it a professional path, a path of political power, or an 
inside track? 
The first of the insiders was Roger Taney, the Attorney General under 
Andrew Jackson.  Taney had been a minor political figure in Maryland (a 
state senator, then a county bank director) until he hitched himself to 
Jackson.20  In the fractured election of 1824, Taney became an “ardent 
Jacksonian.”21  When the split electoral college vote led to a House vote, 
Taney lobbied Maryland’s members of Congress to vote for Jackson.  This 
alliance helped get him appointed as Maryland Attorney General, and then 
as chairman of the Jackson Central Committee of Maryland and an organizer 
of his political convention in Baltimore as part of his successful 1828 
campaign.22  Taney finished his term as Maryland Attorney General, then 
became Jackson’s acting Secretary of War and Attorney General from 1831 
to 1833.23  One of his biographers concludes, “No one as politically astute as 
General Jackson could have been ignorant of one who had taken such a 
prominent part on his behalf.”24  Taney then served as a close advisor and an 
advocate for Jackson as his Attorney General.  After the Senate rejected 
Taney’s nomination for Treasury Secretary, Jackson fought for a year to 
make him chief justice of the Supreme Court, an office he held for twenty-
eight years, up through the Court’s monumental decision in Dred Scott v. 
Sandford,25 and most of the Civil War. 
Benjamin Butler followed Taney immediately as Attorney General and 
followed in his patronage footsteps.26  Butler had joined the Albany Regency, 
Martin Van Buren’s Democratic Party movement turned political machine in 
the 1810s.27  He advanced up through the party from Albany district attorney 
to state assemblyman.28  Jackson plucked him out of the state assembly to 
 
 20. Attorney General:  Roger Brooke Taney, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ 
ag/bio/taney-roger-brooke [https://perma.cc/U4SV-CJEE] (last updated July 7, 2017). 
 21. NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES:  LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 67 (1992). 
 22. Roger Brooke Taney (1777–1864), DICK. C. ARCHIVES & SPECIAL COLLECTIONS 
(2005), http://archives.dickinson.edu/people/roger-brooke-taney-1777-1864 [http://perma.cc/ 
P762-QD4E]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. WALKER LEWIS, WITHOUT FEAR OF FAVOR:  A BIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE ROGER 
BROOKE TANEY 122 (1965). 
 25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 26. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 146 (noting that, even when he was a congressman, 
Butler was “a Radical who had a reputation for protecting political patronage”). 
 27. Arthur A. Ekirch Jr., Benjamin F. Butler of New York:  A Personal Portrait, 58 N.Y. 
HIST., Jan. 1977, at 47, 53 (“He was now also one of the valued, though junior, members of 
Van Buren’s famed Albany Regency.  This informal but politically potent group of 
advisers . . . were part of the Bucktail faction of the Democratic Republican Party.”). 
 28. Attorney General:  Benjamin Franklin Butler, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ 
ag/bio/butler-benjamin-franklin [https://perma.cc/6TRZ-M5ZE] (last updated July 7, 2017). 
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serve as Attorney General, surely serving the request of his Vice President 
Van Buren.29  But the Jackson-Van Buren era of patronage was a short phase 
in terms of the Attorney General’s office. 
The Civil War and Reconstruction brought back some of this patronage.  
James Speed’s brother Joshua was President Lincoln’s closest friend from 
Illinois, and James had been a close friend of Lincoln’s since 1841 while 
building a modest law practice and teaching.30  He won a seat in the Kentucky 
Senate in 1861, and then ascended to the Attorney General’s office.31 
After Lincoln’s assassination, President Andrew Johnson’s administration 
was chaotic and marked by dramatic conflicts, both internally and with 
Congress over Reconstruction.32  Johnson’s Attorney General, Henry 
Stanbery, was a strange choice—a relatively insignificant lawyer and big 
player in Ohio politics.  He had been Attorney General of Ohio from 1846 to 
1851 but then was seemingly out of politics for fifteen years.33  Johnson 
plucked him out of obscurity, and he must have found something wildly 
appealing because he first tried to appoint Stanbery as chief justice of the 
Supreme Court.34  Looking at Stanbery’s thin record, this is not only stunning 
to the historian in hindsight, but it was also a surprise to the Republican 
Senate.35  The Senate rejected the nomination, mostly due to its opposition 
to Johnson and his hostility to Reconstruction.36  In response, Johnson 
nominated Stanbery for Attorney General.37  When U.S. attorneys tried to 
enforce civil rights laws in Kentucky, Stanbery cut them off.38  When 
Johnson was impeached, Stanbery served as his defense counsel.39  Johnson 
seemed to have gotten what he was looking for in Stanbery:  fierce loyalty. 
The Grant era started off with a remarkable set of professionals:  William 
M. Evarts, Ebenezer R. Hoar, and Amos T. Akerman.  The New York Times 
reported that Akerman, a Georgia district attorney, was a “Universal 
Surprise.”40  Congress created the DOJ at this time.41  The traditional view 
 
 29. Id.; see also Ekirch, supra note 27, at 58. 
 30. DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 88, 299 (1995). 
 31. James Speed, FILSON HIST. SOC’Y, https://filsonhistorical.org/james-speed/ 
[https://perma.cc/NZ7Q-TCH7] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 32. Shugerman, supra note 7, at 144–45 (listing various conflicts that arose between 
President Johnson’s administration and Congress). 
 33. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/president/ 
johnson/essays/stanbery-1866-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/TCZ6-VKWX] (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2019). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Erick Trickey, The History of “Stolen Supreme Court Seats,” SMITHSONIAN MAG. 
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/history-stolen-supreme-court-
seats-180962589/ [https://perma.cc/Z6G7-YF32]. 
 36. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), supra note 33; see also Trickey, supra note 35. 
 37. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), supra note 33; see also Trickey, supra note 35. 
 38. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:  THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 38–40 (1985). 
 39. Henry Stanbery (1866–1868), supra note 33. 
 40. Talk at the Capital About the Resignation of Mr. Hoar, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1870, 
http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1870/06/17/87592028.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
4JKB-NMD3]. 
 41. Shugerman, supra note 7, at 122. 
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had been that Congress created the DOJ to increase the federal government’s 
capacity to litigate a growing docket due to the Civil War and to enforce 
Reconstruction and civil rights.42  To the contrary, it was really an effort to 
shrink and professionalize the federal government.43  The creation of the DOJ 
was linked with major professionalization efforts, such as the founding of 
modern bar associations, to make the practice of law more exclusive and 
more independent from partisan politics.44  The DOJ was created to promote 
the norms and structures of professional independence.45  But after the DOJ’s 
first Attorney General, Akerman, followed this aspiration, his successor 
George Williams was more of a Grant crony.   
Williams was a senator who had been supportive of military 
Reconstruction, but by the 1870s, he had lost interest.46  President Grant may 
have appointed Williams not for his help in a civil rights campaign, but rather 
for his help on Grant’s 1872 reelection campaign.47  Then Williams cut back 
on civil rights enforcement.48  Edwards Pierrepont followed Williams, and 
his role can be categorized as a mix of professional and insider.  Pierrepont 
had been the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, a 
significant position then as it is now.49  But what distinguished Pierrepont 
was his prominent and enthusiastic support of President Grant in the election 
campaign of 1872.  He gave a major campaign speech for Grant at the Cooper 
Union in New York, the same location as one of Abraham Lincoln’s famous 
speeches,50 and then traveled around New York, attacking the Democrats’ 
Tammany Ring.51  Pierrepont, a former Democrat, had led the prosecution 
of Tammany Hall, which was the patronage machine controlling New York 
City.52  It was apparently his campaigning for Grant and prosecution of 
Democratic leaders that put Pierrepont in line for Attorney General.  
Pierrepont continued Williams’s moratorium on prosecuting civil rights 
cases to protect former slaves, but he tried to combat corruption in the 
administration and in the Whiskey Ring.53  A rumor spread that he had 
 
 42. Id. at 121. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 123–24. 
 45. Id. at 125. 
 46. Id. at 144 n.138; see also KACZOROWSKI, supra note 38, at 76, 86. 
 47. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 38, at 80–81. 
 48. Id. at 85–87. 
 49. Attorney General:  Edwards Pierrepont, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/bio/ 
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violated his professional duties by helping a defendant in the corruption 
cases.54  Ultimately, these tensions, along with coalition politics, led to his 
departure.55 
For the next forty years, there were no crony attorneys general other than 
William Miller, who had been a close advisor to Benjamin Harrison.56  The 
1910s, however, were a turning point.  President Woodrow Wilson’s 
Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, famous for the “Palmer Raids” during 
the Red Scare, had served as a congressman for only four years—not long 
enough to be a major congressional figure.57  More importantly, he also was 
a deft patronage manager and later made connections while serving on the 
Democratic National Committee.  He was known as a party insider. 
Although he did not support Wilson initially in 1912, once Palmer 
understood that Pennsylvania Democrats were going to back Wilson, Palmer 
shifted enthusiastically to a “committed champion”58 for Wilson and was 
then “inducted into the inner circle of Wilson’s preconvention advisers.”59  
Palmer helped Wilson win the decisive Pennsylvania primary and then 
became Wilson’s floor leader in the contested 1912 Democratic convention, 
sacrificing some of his own political capital to help Wilson win the 
nomination.60  He wanted to be Attorney General more than anything else 
but lost out to a more “professional” figure, James C. McReynolds.  
McReynolds also happened to be a close friend of one of Wilson’s most 
trusted advisors and mentors, Colonel Edward House,61 who disliked 
Palmer.62  Palmer remained in Congress, then lost his race for the Senate in 
1914.63  Now out of Congress, Palmer campaigned vigorously for Wilson’s 
reelection in 1916.64 
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In the second Wilson administration, Palmer served first as Custodian of 
the Office of Alien Property, a wartime role with massive power over 
property and many opportunities to hand out jobs and access to that 
property.65  And he did use his power to hire many political supporters to lay 
a foundation for his own future political campaign, as he had his eyes on 
running for president in 1920.66  He was never charged with corrupt seizure 
of property, but his hires were, and he was blamed for irresponsible 
supervision.67  In 1919, he finally got the job he had wanted for seven years:  
he became Attorney General.  Wilson’s private secretary counseled that the 
Office of the Attorney General had “great power politically” and that “[w]e 
should not trust it to any one who is not heart and soul with us.”68  It seems 
clear that Wilson chose Palmer due to assurances about partisan loyalty.  The 
war was over, and the Red Scare of 1919 had begun.  Palmer worked to 
foment the Scare and feed the public’s panic about Communism, and he 
immediately abused the office’s power to start a policy of mass arrests and 
mass deportations.69  There were legitimate concerns:  radicals had plotted 
major assassinations for May 1, 1919, which were then exposed and 
prevented.70  Palmer’s own house was bombed on June 2, 1919.71  Palmer 
blamed immigrants rather than domestic sources.72  Palmer ordered raids on 
Russian immigrants, which turned out to produce relatively small amounts 
of evidence of radicalism and few deportations, but the newspapers loved the 
raids.73  Palmer increased his crackdowns in 1920 and warned of even bigger 
terror threats.  But those warnings never led to any evidence, the Red Scare 
was settling down, and the public eventually grew tired of Palmer’s self-
promoting fear-mongering.  Newspapers turned against him, and the leading 
legal minds of the time—Felix Frankfurter, Roscoe Pound, Zechariah 
Chafee, and Ernst Freund, followed by Harlan Fiske Stone and Charles Evans 
Hughes—condemned Palmer’s abuse of power.74  Nevertheless, he still 
announced his campaign for president in 1920 with significant support.75  He 
had a sizable number of delegates at the divided 1920 convention, and he 
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stayed in through thirty-eight ballots before dropping out.76  This ended his 
political career.  Palmer’s tenure as Attorney General was marked by his 
abuse of power to feed his political ambition. 
Palmer’s tenure illustrates one reason why the Office of the Attorney 
General became so politically salient:  it built up tremendous power over 
immigration, deportation, and national security over the twentieth century.  It 
is crucial to ensure that the president has sufficient command over those areas 
and that the Attorney General is politically accountable. 
The path from party loyalty to Attorney General escalated in the next 
administration, which established a new norm:  a president appointing his 
campaign manager as head of the DOJ.  Harry M. Daugherty and Warren G. 
Harding had been close friends for twenty years—coming up through the 
same faction of the Ohio Republican Party (the “Foraker faction” in the state 
legislature).77  President William McKinley was from Ohio, and Daugherty 
benefited from his close proximity to such power.  In 1896, Daugherty had 
been one of McKinley’s party insiders and convention managers.78  When 
the Republican Party split between William Howard Taft and Theodore 
Roosevelt in 1912, Daugherty and Harding backed Taft, their fellow Ohioan, 
and played major roles in his campaign.  Harding then won a seat in the U.S. 
Senate in 1914, but Daugherty lost his shot in 1916,79 so Daugherty hitched 
himself to Harding’s presidential ascendancy by serving as his campaign 
manager.80   
Harding won and appointed Daugherty—one of his “Ohio Gang” 
insiders—Attorney General.81  The Ohio Gang then engineered one of the 
most infamous corruption scandals in American history, the Teapot Dome 
scandal.  Daugherty was never directly linked to the scandal, but he could not 
escape suspicions.82  In fact, Daugherty used his power and his officials to 
retaliate against the members of Congress who were investigating him.83  
During prohibition, two of his friends, whom he had hired for DOJ offices, 
used their powers to remove seized liquor and sell it back on the street, sell 
scarce government liquor permits, sell government jobs, engage in financial 
fraud, and obstruct justice.84  Historians have suggested that Daugherty must 
have known.85  Daugherty also cracked down on railroad strikes 
aggressively, and criticism grew that he had been too punitive.  The House 
Judiciary Committee began impeachment hearings on fourteen grounds.86  
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But then Harding died suddenly in 1923, and Calvin Coolidge became 
president.87  Coolidge did not have any special connection to Daugherty, and 
meanwhile, the Teapot Dome scandal grew worse as the 1924 election 
approached.88  Coolidge had more than enough reason to force Daugherty’s 
resignation in 1924.89 
After the consummate professional Harlan Fiske Stone cleaned up this 
mess in his one year as Attorney General, President Coolidge appointed his 
friend from childhood, John Sargent.90  Sargent was a solid insurance lawyer 
and had served in Vermont state government for two years under his cousin, 
the governor, and then served for four years as Vermont’s Attorney 
General.91  He was not exactly a national name. 
Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman ushered in another round of insider 
attorneys general.  Homer Cummings was a prominent lawyer, a local leader 
in Connecticut, and had been chair of the Democratic National Committee.92  
After sitting out politics for decade, he returned to shepherd Roosevelt to the 
Democratic nomination in 1932 as convention floor manager and strategist.93  
When Roosevelt’s first choice for Attorney General died right before his 
inauguration, he turned to Cummings.94  Cummings served as a loyal 
manager and strategist for the New Deal and as the point person for 
Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan of 1937.95  Robert Jackson was famously 
professional in hindsight, but he, too, emerged from partisan insider 
connections.  When Roosevelt was governor, Jackson served on his state 
commissions.96  He had been an early supporter of FDR and served as 
chairman of Democratic Lawyers for Roosevelt.97  Jackson was a key liaison 
during the campaign, became a close friend of Roosevelt’s, then rose up the 
ranks of the DOJ to Attorney General.98  Tom Clark, in addition to being a 
DOJ veteran professional, similarly ascended to Attorney General through 
his well-known close friendship with President Truman.99  J. Howard 
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McGrath was national party chair for Truman’s uphill 1948 race and was 
nominated the following year.100  Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nixon did the 
same for their campaign managers:  Herbert Brownell, Robert Kennedy, and 
John Mitchell, respectively.101 
Of course, Robert Kennedy and John Mitchell are especially famous cases 
of nepotism and cronyism, but they each reflect the downhill fixation with 
fixers in the twentieth century.  A recent biography of Robert Kennedy 
offered a striking narrative of how he made his way to Attorney General.  
Larry Tye reports that Joseph P. Kennedy Sr., the Kennedy patriarch, had 
been talking about having his son Jack as president and Bobby as Attorney 
General for three years before the election.102  He wanted Bobby in the 
cabinet to protect Jack.  However, Bobby was just 35, and he had never 
actually tried a case.  Tye and Michael Beschloss offer a seemingly 
apocryphal quotation from Joe Sr. to the future president:  “When you get to 
the White House there are two jobs you must lock up—Attorney General and 
director of the Internal Revenue Service.”103 
It turns out that this quotation comes from a National Review article in 
1988, attributed to House Speaker John McCormack, so it should be taken 
with a grain of salt.104  Bobby Kennedy continues to receive tremendous 
credit for his professional work as Attorney General as well as his 
commitment to civil rights and to national security issues.  But it is worth 
noting that the Kennedy family’s links to organized crime were never 
investigated in these years.105 
With respect to Joe Sr.’s influence, one biographer wrote: 
On the appointment of the attorney general, Joseph Kennedy had the first 
and last words.  Driven by family pride and the desire to protect his personal 
investments in all of his sons, the father had publicly ordained Robert for 
the office in the 1956 Saturday Evening Post article.  The family had 
humorously bandied the idea about for several years. Eunice Kennedy 
Shriver once playfully suggested that Robert be made attorney general “so 
he can throw all the people Dad doesn’t like in jail.  That means we’ll have 
to build more jails.”106 
Another biographer observed: 
As a business tycoon who lived his own life on the edge of lawlessness, Joe 
also grasped how useful it could be having America’s chief law 
enforcement officer at his dinner table. . . .  The capital teemed with the 
enemies, both Republican and Democratic, that Jack had made during his 
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swift climb to power, while skeletons continued to pile up in his bedroom 
closet.107 
These accounts reflect tremendous pressure from Joe Sr. on John to appoint 
his brother as Attorney General. 
When John eventually did, there was a wave of opposition from the public.  
The New York Times called it “most disappointing,” and prominent Yale Law 
Professor Alexander Bickel said he was “not fit for the office.”108  Robert 
blamed his father, telling reporters it was “his father’s idea” and told them to 
call his father with their concerns.109  Senators in confirmation hearings 
pointed out that he had never tried a case and was remarkably inexperienced 
even for his short ten years out of law school.110  But he was confirmed with 
only one “no” vote, thanks to LBJ’s lobbying of his former colleagues.111  
Robert immediately announced a “war on crime” against racketeering and 
the mafia, building on his book The Enemy Within.112  Robert’s five-point 
plan for combatting organized crime included expanding the DOJ’s 
Organized Crime Section.113  And yet that plan never led to the Kennedy 
family’s ties to organized crime.  There were constant rumors of the Kennedy 
family’s links to organized crime, John’s affair with a mafia party girl, and 
their friend Frank Sinatra’s clear mafia ties, “all of which imperiled the 
legitimacy and credibility of Kennedy’s anticrime program.”114  In fact, 
Robert protected John from scrutiny:  “Informed that [Sicilian gangster Sam] 
Giancana frequently stayed at [Sinatra’s] home in Palm Springs, where the 
president was scheduled to visit in March 1962, Robert insisted that his 
brother make other arrangements.”115 
Robert made sure to push Sinatra away from the Kennedy family, 
protecting John but also limiting the investigations as well.116  Organized 
crime figures mocked Robert as hypocritical and self-serving.117  The FBI 
recorded gangster Vinnie Teresa saying, “[The Kennedys] used [Sinatra] to 
help them raise money.  Then they turn around and say they’re great fighters 
against corruption.  They criticize other people for being with mob guys.  
They’re hypocrites.”118  The FBI investigation of the mob turned up evidence 
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of the president’s various affairs with mafia-connected women, but the FBI 
buried these facts.119 
Lyndon Johnson’s attorneys general were more in the professional model, 
but Nixon’s were not.  John Mitchell, a Nixon appointee, came out of 
nowhere politically to befriend Nixon and run his 1968 and 1972 presidential 
campaigns.120  In the first campaign, he allegedly subverted the Paris Peace 
Accords, which had been progressing toward ending the Vietnam War.121  
When Nixon won, he persuaded J. Edgar Hoover not to conduct a 
background investigation of Mitchell as his Attorney General nominee.122  
After three years as Attorney General, undercutting civil rights and civil 
liberties, Mitchell resigned to become director of the Committee to Reelect 
the President (popularly known as “CREEP”), was implicated in the 
Watergate break-in, and was convicted of perjury and served nineteen 
months in prison.123 
Richard Kleindienst replaced Mitchell after he departed to run the 1972 
campaign.124  Kleindienst had been Deputy Attorney General during the 
federal government’s suit against International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. 
(ITT).125  During Nixon’s first term, he and his advisor and coconspirator, 
John Ehrlichman, had told Kleindienst to drop an antitrust suit against ITT, 
one of his biggest campaign donors, from which Nixon wanted more 
money.126  In 1971, Kleindienst obliged, cutting a favorable deal for ITT.127  
Later, Kleindienst lied to Congress about the ITT case.128  The fact that he 
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was so cooperative with the president’s corruption—and so compromised—
made him a perfect Attorney General for Nixon, and in that role, Mitchell 
returned to him for help to cover up Watergate.129  He resigned as the 
Watergate scandal escalated in 1973.130  In 1974, he pleaded guilty to a minor 
offense in connection with the case.131 
Other Watergate lawyers also went to jail for conspiring to obstruct justice.  
John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s counsel, was found guilty of conspiracy to 
obstruct justice and perjury, and he served eighteen months in prison.132  
Ehrlichman’s aide Egil Krogh had approved the burglary of Daniel Ellsberg’s 
psychiatrist as part of Nixon’s reaction to the leak of the Pentagon Papers, 
and Nixon’s special counsel Charles Colson (i.e., Nixon’s “hatchet man”) 
also helped organize the burglary.133  Krogh intended for the burglary to 
uncover information from Ellsberg’s psychiatrist that could be used to 
discredit Ellsberg.  Krogh was sentenced to two to six years, served four and 
a half months, and was disbarred.134  Colson pleaded guilty to obstruction 
and served seven months.135  John Dean, Nixon’s White House Counsel, was 
convicted of obstruction of justice and served 127 days of a one to four year 
sentence.136  Nixon’s personal attorney, Herbert W. Kalmbach, raised 
campaign funds illegally for legally questionable dark political ops for 
Nixon.137  Kalmbach served six months in jail and lost his law license.138  
Last but not least, G. Gordon Liddy, a former FBI lawyer and prosecutor, 
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organized the Watergate burglary itself and served over four years in 
prison.139 
Reagan’s first Attorney General, William French Smith, was not as 
famously a partisan insider as Reagan’s second, Edwin Meese, but he was 
still a buddy insider from Reagan’s early days in California politics.140  Smith 
was a prominent lawyer in Los Angeles, atop the major firm Gibson, Dunn 
& Crutcher.141  Reagan and Smith met before Reagan’s 1966 campaign for 
governor, and Smith became part of Reagan’s “kitchen cabinet,” his small 
group of close advisors.142  Reagan appointed Smith to the University of 
California Board of Regents in 1968, and Smith would go on to serve three 
terms as chairman while also serving on the board of a number of major 
corporations in California and nationally.143  He was a delegate representing 
California in the Republican National Conventions of 1968, 1972, and 1976, 
serving as the chairman of the delegation in 1968 and vice chairman in 1972 
and 1976.144  Reagan, uncoincidentally, challenged President Gerald Ford 
for the Republican nomination in 1976.145  When Reagan eventually won in 
1980, he immediately brought Smith with him to Washington as his Attorney 
General.146 
Reagan’s second Attorney General was Edwin Meese, his close friend and 
Chief of Staff during his governorship.147  Meese was also his 1980 
presidential campaign’s senior official and transition head.148  As “counsellor 
to the president,”149 Meese was deeply involved with political strategy and 
outreach to the Evangelical community.  His four years as Attorney General 
 
 139. Id. at 679, 681 n.19. 
 140. Edward J. Boyer, William French Smith, 73, Dies; Reagan Adviser and Atty. Gen., 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 30, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-10-30/local/me-3410_1_ 
william-french-smith [https://perma.cc/8379-5M3L] (“After meeting Reagan in 1963, Smith 
became the future President’s personal lawyer, confidant and business adviser.  He has been 
credited with engineering Reagan’s rise to wealth at a time when the former actor’s primary 
income was royalties from movies.”). 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Attorney General:  William French Smith, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
bio/smith-william-french [https://perma.cc/B88L-TZBE] (last updated June 26, 2017). 
 144. Appointment of William French Smith as a Member of the President’s Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM (Feb. 28, 
1985), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/22885b [https://perma.cc/446R-
EU3W]. 
 145. Lee Edwards, Ronald Reagan vs. Gerald Ford:  The 1976 GOP Convention Battle 
Royal, NAT’L INT. (Apr. 16, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/ronald-reagan-
vs-gerald-ford-the-1976-gop-convention-battle-15818 [https://perma.cc/JR55-EYGK]. 
 146. Attorney General:  William French Smith, supra note 143. 
 147. See Attorney General:  Edwin Meese, III, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
bio/meese-edwin-iii [https://perma.cc/8N8A-PY2U] (last updated June 26, 2017). 
 148. Edwin Meese III, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/staff/edwin-meese-iii 
[https://perma.cc/DV8Z-HFVU] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019). 
 149. Id. 
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were tainted by Iran-Contra questions, the Bechdel scandal, and the Wedtech 
scandal, which led to his resignation in 1988.150   
Since Meese, the trend shifted back to more professionals and politicos, 
until George W. Bush appointed Alberto Gonzales to follow John 
Ashcroft.151  Previously, Gonzales had served as general counsel to Bush, 
and Bush elevated him to the Texas Supreme Court.152  After two years, he 
resigned from the court to join the Bush administration as White House 
counsel in 2001153 before Bush appointed him Attorney General in 2005.154  
He played the central role in the partisan firing of U.S. attorneys, which led 
to his resignation.155 
President Trump’s first Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, fits more as the 
established politician, but he was a campaign insider as well.156  He was the 
first senator to endorse Trump, and his direct involvement with the campaign 
affiliated him with Russia contacts that led to his recusal from the special 
investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election.157 
This overview of attorneys general who advanced through personal or 
political connections is not meant to show that such backgrounds always lead 
to corruption.  They do not seem to.  But it does show that norms of 
independence of the DOJ from the president—either because of political 
clout or professionalism—once existed but have eroded significantly.  
Almost every president from FDR to Reagan appointed his campaign 
manager or national party chairman to be Attorney General at some point, 
and this problem has worsened. 
Considering how these norms are crashing down all around us, what can 
be done structurally to protect independence?  Can Congress change those 
structures—altering appointment powers, removal powers, or otherwise—to 
restore independence more formally by statute? 
 
 150. See Atty. Gen. Meese Resigns:  Says He’s Been Cleared and Leaves with Clean Name:  
Acts After Prosecutor Files Report, L.A. TIMES (July 5, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/ 
1988-07-05/news/mn-5430_1_meese-resigns [https://perma.cc/L92S-7497]. 
 151. Attorney General:  Alberto R. Gonzales, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/ 
ag/bio/gonzales-alberto-r [https://perma.cc/ZGV2-8FGH] (last updated June 26, 2017). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Steven Lee Myers & Philip Shenon, Embattled Attorney General Resigns, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 27, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/27/washington/27cnd-gonzales.html 
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 156. See Eli Stokols, Sen. Jeff Sessions Endorses Trump, POLITICO (Feb. 28, 2016), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2016/02/sen-jeff-sessions-endorses-trump-219939 
[https://perma.cc/XQ9V-7YZ5]. 
 157. Kevin Johnson, Trump Fires Jeff Sessions, Names Matthew Whitaker as Interim 
Attorney General, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/2018/11/07/jeff-sessions-resigns-attorney-general-trump/512600001/ 
[https://perma.cc/2MCX-E3EU]. 
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II.  ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS 
Independent agencies originated soon after the creation of the DOJ in 
1870.158  Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 
1887, the first commission with staggered terms and protection from at-will 
removal.159  The ICC became a model for independent agencies, which grew 
in number during the Progressive Era and the New Deal.160 
Could Congress apply some aspects of this model to the Office of the 
Attorney General and the Department of Justice?  Before considering the 
details of those models, the first big-picture question is whether alternatives 
are possible.  Must the Department of Justice fit the unitary-executive 
theory161 in terms of complete control by the president for appointing, 
directing, and removal?  Or can there be an alternative model consistent with 
Article II of the Constitution? 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson, upholding the 
constitutionality of the Office of Independent Counsel by a 7-1 vote,162 
indicates that the answer is yes.  But today, many celebrate that lone dissent, 
written by Justice Antonin Scalia, and hail it as one of the greatest dissents 
in American history.163  The majority allowed Congress to create a 
prosecutorial office as an inferior office, appointed and supervised by three 
circuit judges, and protected from presidential removal.164  Justice Scalia 
made a series of historical assertions about the unitary executive for all 
prosecution and rejected the independent counsel structure.165  However, 
Scalia’s dissent made a number of incorrect assumptions about American 
history, which should be a fatal flaw on his own originalist terms.166  I do not 
 
 158. See Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and 
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 770–71 (2013); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, 
The Dependent Origins of Independent Agencies:  The Interstate Commerce Commission, the 
Tenure of Office Act, and the Rise of Modern Campaign Finance, 31 J.L. & POL. 139, 142 
(2014). 
 159. Datla & Revesz, supra note 158, at 776. 
 160. Id. at 771 & n.2, 772, 776–77. 
 161. See id. at 831–32 (explaining that the unitary-executive theory “holds that Article II 
‘is a grant to the president of all of the executive power, which includes the power to remove 
and direct all lower-level executive officials’” (quoting STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER 
S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3–4 
(2008))); Peter M. Shane, The Originalist Myth of the Unitary Executive, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. 
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executive thesis interpret the Constitution as guaranteeing the President plenary authorities, 
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possess under law.”). 
 162. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988).  Justice Anthony Kennedy took no part 
in the consideration or the decision of the case. Id. at 658. 
 163. See Terry Eastland, Scalia’s Finest Opinion, WKLY. STANDARD (Mar. 11, 2016), 
https://www.weeklystandard.com/terry-eastland/scalias-finest-opinion [https://perma.cc/ 
RRM3-KFP4]. 
 164. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 655, 658, 661 n.3. 
 165. Id. at 727–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 166. I first published this historical argument in Slate. See Shugerman, supra note 14.  
Some of the language in this paper is excerpted from this article.  This conference paper does 
not offer the complete historical argument, but I will be elaborating on it in a future article. 
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present the full argument in this piece, but I simply summarize some key 
points.167 
Scalia’s core argument in his Morrison dissent was that “[g]overnment 
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive 
function.”168  He continued:  “We should say here that the President’s 
constitutionally assigned duties include complete control over investigation 
and prosecution of violations of the law, and that the inexorable command of 
Article II is clear and definite:  the executive power must be vested in the 
President of the United States.”169 
The Supreme Court has rejected the unitary model where administrative 
officers exercise a mixed role of “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” 
authority.170  This rule permits many vital independent agencies, such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and Federal Trade Commission, to 
function with a significant degree of independence.171  But if prosecution has 
historically been exclusively an executive power, the proponents of the 
unitary executive contend that the president must have an unfettered power 
to appoint, direct, and remove those officers at will.172  Historians have 
demonstrated that this view simply was not true in the founding era.173  
Scalia’s dissent in Morrison is simply inconsistent with his purportedly 
originalist method. 
First, for much of English and American history, most prosecution was not 
an executive function at all because it was a private enterprise.174  In 
England, the vast majority of criminal prosecution was by private parties, as 
historians like John Langbein, Patrick Devlin, and many others have 
explained.175  The vast majority of American prosecutions were still private 
 
 167. For more on opposing views on these questions and historical interpretations 
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 168. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727–32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. at 710; see also Shugerman, supra note 14. 
 170. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690–91 (“[I]t was not essential to the President’s proper 
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 171. See id. at 687–88 (explaining that executive removal powers over officers of 
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influence” that “would ‘threate[n] the independence of [the agencies]”). 
 172. Id. at 706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Governmental investigation and prosecution of 
crimes is a quintessentially executive function.”). 
 173. Dangel, supra note 167, at 1070 (1990) (“An analysis of the Framers’ 
writings . . . shows that the Framers did not intend prosecution to be a core executive 
function . . . .  [The Framers] provided that most prosecution would be undertaken by officials 
within the executive branch, but not necessarily executive officials subject to presidential 
control through appointment, direction, and removal.”). 
 174. See Shugerman, supra note 7, at 129 (“A significant number of the prosecutions were 
undertaken by private parties during [the founding era].”). 
 175. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 313, 317 (1973) (“For a very long time, really into the nineteenth century, the 
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through the mid-nineteenth century, as Allen Steinberg and many other 
historians have demonstrated.176  The rough consensus is that the public 
prosecutor did not overtake private prosecution in America until after the 
Civil War, and yet private prosecution continued deep into the twentieth 
century.177  Even today, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Virginia, and Texas allow private citizens to serve a role in criminal 
prosecutions.178 
Second, Scalia hedged a bit by talking about “governmental” 
prosecutions,179 but even this fallback position is inaccurate.  Congressional 
committees investigate crimes with subpoena power, and Congress has 
authority to enforce these powers with its own legislative contempt 
proceedings.180  Contempt of Congress is a criminal offense, and it has 
historically been prosecuted entirely within the legislature.181 
Third, historians have pointed out that the Judiciary Act of 1789 undercuts 
Scalia further on his “governmental prosecution” claim.182  The statute in the 
First Congress allowed deputy marshals to be removed by federal judges.183  
 
English relied upon a predominant, although not exclusive, component of private 
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(stating that, in New Hampshire, “[t]he common law . . . does not preclude the institution and 
prosecution of certain criminal complaints by private citizens”); State v. Storm, 661 A.2d 790, 
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attention of the grand jury for investigation and action.  The law does not restrict the method 
by which this may be done.”); Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985) 
(stating that, in Virginia, the common law “generally permits the appearance of private counsel 
to assist the prosecution”). 
 179. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Governmental 
investigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” (emphasis 
added)). 
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 183. See id. 
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As Jennifer Mascott has explained, Congress designated for deputy marshals 
an executive law enforcement role, and their removability by judges 
“suggest[s] that the deputies had their own identity and their own measure of 
accountability apart from the primary marshals.”184  At the same time, 
Mascott also indicates that deputy marshals may have had more limited 
subordinate roles, so until we know more about their function, we should not 
rely too heavily on this one example.185 
Even today, federal judges have the power to appoint interim U.S. 
attorneys.186  The first draft of the Judiciary Act also would have given the 
Supreme Court the power to appoint the Attorney General and gave district 
judges the power to appoint district attorneys.187  These provisions were 
deleted and not replaced, so their appointment reverted to the default under 
the Constitution:  presidential appointment.188  But the First Congress 
showed in this draft that they did not think Scalia’s view was at all obvious, 
settled, or quintessential.189  It certainly reflects that the role of the Attorney 
General and the U.S. attorneys was unsettled and fluid in this period.190 
Fourth, observers in the early republic indicated the federal judges 
themselves led what appeared to be prosecutions during the Whiskey 
Rebellion of 1794, and initiated prosecutions under the Alien and Sedition 
Acts by convening and presiding over grand juries.191 
Fifth, it is important to study what the states were doing at this time.  The 
states are usually important for understanding original public meaning in 
order to provide context.  But this is especially true for the question of law 
enforcement because so much federal law enforcement depended directly on 
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the states.192  The federal government had a minor role in criminal law in this 
era.193  In some cases, Congress used criminal fines to achieve its limited 
regulatory goals, but it relied heavily on state officials and state courts, as 
well as private plaintiffs.194  When Congress used criminal fines to enforce 
the Embargo Act of 1807, the government found that it had too few district 
attorneys, with too little time, to prosecute offenders, and the embargo was 
made a mockery.195 
State constitutions reflect how the founding generation understood the role 
of law enforcement and how it actually enforced the law.  They adopted 
separate branches and often declared a separation of powers explicitly, unlike 
the federal Constitution.196  Nevertheless, many state constitutions did not 
reflect Scalia’s formalism.  Early state constitutions sometimes placed 
attorneys general and prosecutors under the judiciary article or judicial 
sections of their constitutions.197  These constitutions grouped attorneys 
general together with judges and judicial officers.198  These practices 
continued in many new frontier states established from the 1790s through the 
1830s.199  Moreover, some of the constitutions assigned the power of 
appointment of law enforcement officials to the legislature with no role for 
the governor, and some assigned this appointment power to judges.200 
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alternative in appointing an expanding system of public prosecutors:   
In 1777, New York created a Council on Appointments, which consisted of the 
governor and an annually rotating panel of four senators.  The Council appointed all 
state officers, including justices of the peace, district attorneys, and sheriffs.  The 
Council was designed to limit the governor’s control over the state bureaucracy, and 
also to limit popular democracy.  From 1777 to 1821, the Council appointed 15,000 
officers.  It was heavily criticized, but if it had been designed better, I am curious if 
it could have been a successful model for a less partisan method of building a 
prosecutorial system.  It certainly could have been a foundation for a more 
consensus-oriented, professionally-based system, as the council could have evolved 
to change the council membership but not the basic structure.  On the other hand, 
any method of appointment might have succumbed to the Jacksonian democratic 
wave. 
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For example, Virginia’s 1776 Constitution—drafted by James Madison, 
George Mason, and other key figures of the founding—gave the governor the 
power to appoint justices of the peace but gave the legislature the power to 
appoint attorneys general and gave judges the power to appoint sheriffs, 
coroners, and constables.201  These founders did not share Scalia’s 
assumptions. 
For those who are skeptical of originalism, this history of prosecution may 
confirm how difficult it is to discern clear, stable interpretive binding 
meaning from nuanced, complicated, and multifaceted sources and practices.  
For those who subscribe to original public meaning, this history shows that 
the design of the executive branch is far more open-ended than many 
ostensible originalists have claimed. 
III.  STRUCTURAL INDEPENDENCE FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL DOJ OFFICERS? 
In 1870, Congress created the DOJ to reduce the partisan patronage in 
hiring government lawyers and to professionalize government lawyers.202  
Following the corruption scandals of the 1870s, Congress passed the 
Pendleton Act of 1883 to establish the civil service in the executive branch 
for lower bureaucratic appointments.203  A few years later, Congress created 
the ICC, the model for independent agencies with job security and staggered, 
long terms, that proliferated through the twentieth century.204  This wave of 
professional reform laid a foundation for independence from partisans in the 
executive branch, but these reforms were limited in their scope and extent.205  
It is time to debate whether to elevate these reforms into the upper echelons 
of the DOJ, from the Attorney General down to the U.S. attorneys.  This Part 
offers an initial set of thoughts and proposals to suggest some structural 
reforms that I will elaborate in future work in more detail. 
Myers v. United States206 held that Congress cannot limit presidential 
power to remove executive officials.207  But the equally canonical precedent 
Humphrey’s Executor v. United States208 distinguishes executive offices 
from “quasi-judicial” and “quasi-legislative” offices.209  As noted in the 
introduction, the office of U.S. Attorney General has often been called 
“quasi-judicial” (or recognized as having “quasi-judicial” features) long 
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before Humphrey’s Executor.210  This was Attorney General Caleb 
Cushing’s frequently cited formulation.  Attorney General Edward Bates 
similarly wrote, “The office I hold is not properly political, but strictly legal; 
and it is my duty, above all other ministers of State to uphold the Law and to 
resist all encroachments, from whatever quarter, of mere will and power.”211  
Other parts of the DOJ are quasi-judicial, such as the Office of Legal Counsel 
and the Solicitor General. 
Thus, if the Attorney General and parts of the DOJ are quasi-judicial, they 
might be structurally removed from unitary control, so long as the structure 
does not intrude upon or obstruct the president’s duty to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed.  In Humphrey’s Executor, the Court held 
unanimously: 
The authority of Congress, in creating quasi legislative or quasi judicial 
agencies, to require them to act in discharge of their duties independently 
of executive control cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as 
an appropriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall 
continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in the 
meantime.  For it is quite evident that one who holds his office only during 
the pleasure of another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of 
independence against the latter’s will.212 
Thus, Congress could take parts of the DOJ and refashion them in the model 
of independent commissions or other reforms, fixing the terms and 
forbidding their removal except for cause. 
If one of the core problems is the crony-ization of the Office of Attorney 
General itself, can that office be redesigned for more independence?  Could 
Congress forbid the removal of the Attorney General from office except for 
cause?  Lower courts have confronted the problem of a single head of an 
agency who can be removed only for cause.  In PHH Corp. v. CFPB,213 the 
D.C. Circuit first held that a single head cannot have such insulation because 
it concentrates too much executive power in one person separate from 
presidential control.214  The D.C. Circuit then reheard the case en banc and 
upheld the structure.215  The CFPB appears to be more quasi-legislative and 
quasi-judicial than the DOJ, or at least judges are more likely to distinguish 
them.  It is likely that courts would find such insulation of the Attorney 
General to interfere with the president’s executive power under the Vesting 
Clause and his or her duties under the Take Care Clause.216  Too much 
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executive power would be concentrated in an insulated principal officer.  
Such a proposal seems unlikely to survive a challenge. 
Could the Office of the Attorney General be turned into a commission with 
staggered terms to avoid the concentration problem in PHH?  Could the 
Attorney General be turned into an Attorneys’ Commission, or a Justice 
Commission with staggered terms?  Article II does not explicitly forbid such 
a structure, but it might implicitly.  The Appointment Clause states:  
“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments.”217  A “head” of a department might not be limited to a 
single person, but it depends how one reads “head.”  It is unclear if a “head” 
of a department ever meant multiple people in England or at the American 
founding, and no department today is headed by a commission, even if there 
are many independent agencies under those departments.  It is plausible to 
imagine such a commission of attorneys general with staggered terms.  But 
it is more plausible that federal courts would find that this design violates 
Article II.  In any case, the lesson from commissions is that an even number 
of commissioners leads to paralysis, so such a structure would probably need 
to be an odd number of commissioners to make sure the president can take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
Given the constitutional challenges that likely await such a novel design 
of department leadership, perhaps it makes more sense to focus on more 
plausible designs.  Congress could retain the single Attorney General who 
serves at will, but other principal officers could be turned into a bipartisan 
staggered commission under the Attorney General, with the protection of for-
cause removal.  Principal officers can be given such job security.218  Instead 
of a hierarchy of a Deputy Attorney General, an Associate Attorney General, 
and Assistant Attorneys General as heads of DOJ offices, imagine a Justice 
Commission under the Attorney General.  The Attorney General and perhaps 
the Deputy Attorney General would remain from the old unitary structure, 
but they would join a commission of Assistant Attorneys General who 
supervise the offices.  Because these are principal offices, the President 
would have to nominate and the Senate confirm them.219  But a statute could 
require bipartisan membership.  The terms also could be staggered and set 
for a number of years to have crossovers from an earlier administration. 
One possible structure that would avoid interfering with the executive 
power would be members who serve five-year terms removable only for 
cause.  Each president gets to name one at the beginning of his or her term, 
and then a new one each year.  Let us imagine that there are five Assistant 
Attorneys General who are part of this independent structure and rotation, 
but there are four additional members who also sit and vote on the 
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commission:  the Attorney General, a Deputy Attorney General, and two 
Associate Attorneys General.  From the beginning of every presidential term, 
the president will have named five of the nine members—a majority.  But 
one of those new appointees will be an assistant with job security, and thus 
may be more free to be a swing vote, a conscience on the committee, and 
perhaps a whistleblower.  After that first year, the president gradually 
increases his or her majority.  One key point is that the commission would 
always hold over from the previous administration to at least be a possible 
check on the DOJ, cronyism, or election-year rigging.  That is why the terms 
would be five years.  Putting someone on the inside of the DOJ from the 
opposing party is important even if his or her vote has limited power in the 
minority. 
Even less complicated is the possibility of creating independent 
commissions within the DOJ that do not include the Attorney General.220  
The Office of Legal Counsel is more than quasi-judicial.  It is self-conceived 
as almost-judicial.  It has a norm of following precedent substantively, so 
perhaps that norm could be reinforced with staggered terms and entrenched 
officers from the last administration.  One can imagine the Solicitor General 
being turned into an independent Solicitors’ Commission to similar effect, 
which would encourage a more judicious, reliable, and consistent approach 
to cases.  It would be slightly more difficult for the Solicitor General to 
reverse earlier positions if there are holdovers from a previous 
administration.  The rule of law benefits from more consistency and from 
having a different perspective in the room to challenge ideological thinking. 
There are other offices that could be recreated following such an 
independent model, such as the Office of Legal Policy or the Office of 
Legislative Affairs.  The DOJ’s Inspectors General have been praised for 
their independence and their role as watchdogs, and that norm can be 
reinforced structurally with job security.221  The structure of the FBI reflects 
a part of the independence model.  The director may be removed at will, as 
we now know, of course, but the director is appointed to a ten-year term.222  
The Inspectors General should have similarly long terms.  But to be clear, 
the FBI may arguably be less appropriate for additional job security because 
its role is less quasi-judicial and more investigatory and executive. 
Another possible reform is outside of Main Justice.  A statute could protect 
the U.S. attorneys from presidential removal at will.  Instead, they could be 
removable only for cause.  This reform would limit the president’s power to 
dictate law enforcement and prosecution, but it would acknowledge the 
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expectations of judicious and independent decision-making by prosecutors a 
bit more insulated from partisan pressures.  Recall Alberto Gonzales and the 
2006 firing scandal.223  These reforms might frustrate a president, but that is 
the price of protecting prosecutorial fairness and independence from political 
pressures and partisanship. 
CONCLUSION 
“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”224  
Officers take an oath to “faithfully execute” their offices.225  Our current 
structures and norms of partisanship, self-dealing, and cronyism are not 
conducive to faithful execution.  This historical overview of the Office of the 
Attorney General shows the erosion of the norms of professionalism and 
independence and a growing threat to the rule of law.  But the history of the 
founding era was less rigid and formal about executive power and 
institutional design, which also suggests that we can be more flexible and 
creative about the design of these offices and the DOJ today.  Congress 
should borrow from the independent commission-independent agency model 
to reinforce those norms and to restore professionalism, structural 
independence, and the impartial rule of law. 
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Also in 2006, U.S. Attorney Steven Biskupic prosecuted Georgia Thompson, a 
career civil servant in Wisconsin for allegedly steering a state contract to a travel 
agency owned by supporters of Democratic Governor Jim Doyle.  Thompson’s 
conviction for mail fraud and misapplication of federal funds became a centerpiece 
in the Republican campaign against Doyle.  A year later, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals overturned the conviction, finding that the prosecution’s case was 
“preposterous” and without evidence, that the agency had submitted the lowest bid, 
that there was “not so much of a whiff of impropriety,” and that Thompson was 
“innocent.”  The Court ordered her immediate release.  It turns out that, in 2005, 
U.S. Attorney Biskupic had been on a list of U.S. Attorneys to be considered for 
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fraud cases against Democrats.  After Biskupic indicted Thompson, his name came 
off of that list. 
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